

SaaSy detection

Purple Teaming Software-as-a-Service Platforms

Nick Jones and Chris Philipov



How many
SaaS products
do you use at
work on a daily
basis?



TL;DR

SaaS is a Huge Attack Surface in Most Organisations

Critical attack surface, too – lots of critical data in most organisations' SaaS applications

Early Days, but Some Problems Already Obvious

Log format heterogeneity

Even harder to separate good from bad than cloud infra

Where to start:

Business critical apps – CRM and similar, HR apps, SCM/CICD in dev houses etc

Well known platforms – most likely to get hit by attackers first

Who Are We?

Chris Philipov




Senior Security Consultant

Nick Jones



Principal Security Consultant
Cloud Security Lead

The SaaS Security Landscape



What's the deal with SaaS



\$54 B



slack

\$251 M




ATLASSIAN

\$689 M




\$18 B*

SaaS Map of an Average Organization...



SaaS Map Attack Vectors



SaaS involved Breaches


SaaS solutions stand as a key part in major breaches

Attackers aim to use any access as much as they can

Difficult to prevent, so how do we spot it?


How Hackers Used Slack to Break into EA Games

A representative for the hackers explained to Motherboard how the group stole a wealth of data from the game publishing giant.



Social media boosting service exposed thousands of Instagram passwords

Zack Whittaker @zackwhittaker / 5:19 PM GMT • January 30, 2020

 Comment

Okta's Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise

Breaches 2: Electric Boogaloo

SolarWinds Orion: More US government agencies hacked

🕒 15 December 2020

\$938M

A Devastating Twitch Hack Sends Streamers Reeling

The data breach apparently includes source code, gamer payouts, and more.

\$2.3B




Detection in SaaS apps



secure

What is so different about SaaS?

	Responsibility	SaaS	PaaS	IaaS	On-prem
Responsibility always retained by the customer	Information and data	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer
	Devices (Mobile and PCs)	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer
	Accounts and identities	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer
Responsibility varies by type	Identity and directory infrastructure	Shared	Shared	Customer	Customer
	Applications	Microsoft	Shared	Customer	Customer
	Network controls	Microsoft	Shared	Customer	Customer
	Operating system	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	Customer
Responsibility transfers to cloud provider	Physical hosts	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer
	Physical network	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer
	Physical datacenter	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer

 Microsoft  Customer  Shared


Less Control

Reliant on provider's controls

- Compensating controls *sometimes* possible
- At mercy of provider for new controls

Purchase process is critical

- Establish baseline control requirements for SaaS products
- Evaluate controls **BEFORE** purchase




Less Visibility



Telemetry format variation

- Totally unstandardized at present
- Increases effort requirements to integrate different apps
- For now, leverage whatever your SIEM provider offers where possible
- If no support for most of your SaaS apps, you need a translation layer
- Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework should help!



The Tyranny of Product Tiers

Slack

- Enterprise logging only available in top tiers

GitHub

- Audit logs available in app, but logging APIs only exposed to enterprise tier users

Microsoft 365

- Complex licensing makes it hard to work out what you have access to

The Pitfalls of SaaS Detection



Telemetry Pitfalls

Require data from multiple events




- Disabling branch protection – actions logged are “protected_branch.destroy” and “protected_branch.policy_override”

Require data from different APIs


- Promote user to Organization Owner – action logged is “org.update_member”

Require integration with separate API




- Promote User to Repository Admin – action logged is “edited”




The difficulty that defenders face



Bringing S(ecurity) to SaaS



Threat Modelling for SaaS



Users

01 Who Are The Users?

How widely used will this be?

What's the risk factor of these users?

03 Authentication Approach

Can you use SSO?

If local auth, how do we manage joiners/leavers?

02 Permissions System

How fine-grained can you make permissions?

Can you easily implement separation of duties/roles?

04 Secondary Auth Controls

Multi-factor authentication?

Conditional Access Policies?



Resources

Application Purpose

Why has this been purchased, how is it used?

Types of Data


What types of data is the app storing? How critical is the data? What are the risks if stolen/tampered with?

Data Storage


How does the data storage work? Is it encrypted? How? What access does the provider have?

Data Transmission

What protocols is the data accessed over? Where is the application expecting to send/receive data?



Integrations



Security Assessment

Validate Control Efficacy

Not uncommon to find that controls don't work as expected, so test to confirm

Simulate Attacker Activity


Use the threat model to identify likely TTPs; validate expected telemetry is generated

Validate Configuration

Ensure that the SaaS has been configured according to organization requirements

Validate Blast Radius

Given a particular type of compromised user, confirm access and likely damage



Process

A IMPLEMENT DETECTIONS


Develop a set of use cases for the app, given the threat model

B SIMULATE ATTACKS


Execute TTPs from the threat model against the application

C EVALUATE RESULTS


Confirm detections behaved as expected, confirm necessary improvements or next detections to implement



Building Detection



Detection Collaboration



How to prioritise?

Use your risk models

- Are you a hospital? Start with patient data
- Payroll firm? Start with PII
- Tech firm? Software IP

Identity is the key




- If not sure where to start, begin with IdP
- For other systems, start with authentication use cases




imgflip.com

JAKE-CLARK.TUMBLR

What is the goal?

COMPROMISED CODEBASE 	SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT 	COMPROMISED CI/CD PIPELINES 
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attacker has modified application codebase• Attacker has modified Infrastructure-as-Code	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attacker gains access to a Social Media Management app	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attacker has modified checks performed during a pipeline deployment



On a scale of
1-10, how
confident are you
in your SaaS
logging and
monitoring?



Takeaways



Critical Data, Little Control

SaaS is unique in data criticality vs the data vs how little control and visibility is available



SaaS Detection is Nascent

Needs more research and investment, both from providers and client organizations



It's a Team Effort

Combine offensive & defensive experience with product subject matter expertise for best effect

Some links

<https://www.secwiki.cloud/saas/methodology>

- High-level methodology for assessing SaaS applications

<https://www.withsecure.com/en/expertise/resources/purple-teams-with-wings>

- Paper from Nick Jones and Alfie Champion on purple teaming in the cloud

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secure

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